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Confronta ciertos enigmas surgidos en torno a la 
naturaleza e identidad de la obra musical, y rechaza 
estos enigmas por irreales: o bien ellos conciernen 
a la obra musical en sí misma, en cuyo caso son 
enigmas acerca del estatus metafísico de un objeto 
intencional, y por lo tanto susceptibles a una 
solución arbitraria, o bien ellos conciernen a los 
sonidos con los que la obra es escuchada, en cuyo 
caso simplemente se trata de casos especiales de los 
problemas concernientes a la naturaleza e 
identidad de los eventos. 
 
 Confronts certain puzzles raised about the nature 
and identity of the musical work, and dismisses 
these puzzles as unreal: either they concern the 
musical work itself, in which case they are puzzles 
about the metaphysical status of an intentional 
object, and therefore susceptible to an arbitrary 
solution, or they concern the sounds in which the 
work is heard, in which case they are simply special 
cases of the problems concerning the nature and 
identity of events. 
Eventos · Identidad · Objeto Intencional · Obras 
Musicales · Ontología. 
 Events · Identity · Intentional Object · Musical 
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The Ontology of the Musical Work 
 
 





N DESCRIBING THE PHENOMENAL NATURE OF MUSIC, I have avoided raising the 
ontological question: what exactly is a work of music? When is work A the 
same as work B, and what hangs on the answer? And with this question of 
identity come others, no less interesting and no less difficult: what is the 
relation between a work and a (true) performance of it? What is the relation 
between a work and an arrangement of it? What do we mean by «versions» of the 
same work? When judging a work of music, how do we separate the qualities of 
the music from those of the performance? If an improvisation is written down 
and played again, is that a performance of the very same work? And so on. Such 
questions may not be equally important, and they may also be less important 
than they have seemed to recent philosophers. Nevertheless we must answer 
some of them before we can give a clear account of the meaning of music. 
Before beginning, however, there is a point of method that needs to be borne 
in mind. Several writers (notably Carl Dahlhaus, Edward Said, Lydia Goehr, and 
others influenced by Adorno)1 have argued that the habit of identifying 
individual works of music is a recent one, coinciding with the rise of a listening 
public, and with the institution of concert‐going as a cultural practice. Music 
was not always the solemn occasion that it has become in the culture of 
bourgeois Europe and America. Far more often in the history of mankind it has 
been part of a larger event: worship, dancing, ceremony, even battle. In such 
circumstances people do not stand back and focus on the piece itself, nor do 
they savour the sounds as modern listeners do. Some argue further, that 
aesthetic interest is not a human universal, as Kantian philosophers claim, but 
part of the ideology of bourgeois culture.2 Only in the context of that culture 
does the practice of identifying individual works of art and their authors make 
 
1 Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music, tr. W. Austin (Cambridge, 1982), and The Idea of Absolute Music, tr. R. Lustig 
(Chicago, 1989); Said, Musical Elaborations (London, 1991); Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works 
(Oxford, 1992). 
2 See esp. P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, tr. R. Nice (London, 1984); and T. 
Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford, 1990). 
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sense. 
To both these claims see chapters «14. Performance» and «15. Culture» of my 
The Aesthetics of Music3. But a preliminary response is called for, if we are to 
venture with confidence into the realm of musical ontology. It is an important 
and interesting observation, that the practice of listening to music, and in 
particular of listening to it in the reverent hush of a concert hall, is neither a 
human universal, nor the whole of musical experience. It is also an interesting 
observation (should it be true) that the habit of identifying specific musical 
works arose precisely in the context of a «listening» culture. The fact remains, 
however, that we do identify individual works, and identify them as the particular 
objects of aesthetic interest. Even when the habit of identifying works of music 
was not yet established, people had an aesthetic interest in performances: the 
writings of Plato, St Augustine, and Boethius abundantly testify to this. And 
while people then listened in a different way, nevertheless they listened, and 
heard at least some of the musical phenomena that I described in chapter «2. 
Tone» of my The Aesthetics of Music. The questions that now concern us will not 
dissolve merely because such people did not notice them. For they are questions 
that may be raised whenever people listen to music, and whenever they 
experience the thing listened to as «the same again». 
There is a general question, too, about the bearing of historical theories on 
philosophy. Many writers—particularly those from a Marxian background—
remark on the «historicity» of intellectual problems, implying that they become 
problems only in certain historical contexts, and cease to be intelligible outside 
the cultural conditions from which they arose. (Consider the question: What is 
virtue? as discussed by Plato and Aristotle; or the question: How is private 
property justified? as posed by Locke.) The implication is that the problems 
arise always within the ideology of a period, from concepts which are neither 
necessary to us as human beings, nor useful when lifted from their cultural 
roots. 
I doubt that any such thing is ever true of a philosophical question. It is not 
merely that history has shown that philosophical questions, once discovered, do 
not dissolve with a change of the cultural climate. It is that they are not of a 
nature to dissolve, any more than are the questions of mathematics. People in 
our culture take an intense interest in works of music. They listen to them for 
their intrinsic qualities, and are eager to compare one work with another. The 
philosophical question is this: what are they listening to and assessing with such 
 
3 See Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford, 1993) 
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fervour? That question will not dissolve, just because people at some future time 
should cease to listen, or cease to notice the existence of individual works, any 
more than the question «What are numbers?» will disappear, when people lose 
all skill in mathematics. Our ability to notice philosophical questions may 
change with historical conditions; the questions themselves do not. 
 
§1. Some puzzles about Identity 
Although we distinguish works of music from their performances, we are by no 
means clear as to how the works themselves should be counted. Is an 
arrangement of a work another work, or just the same work adjusted? You might 
say that it depends on the adjustment. For example, Mahler made an 
arrangement for string orchestra of Schubert's «Death and the Maiden» 
Quartet, D810. He did very little to the quartet, apart from preventing the 
double basses from swamping the lower register, and for pages the two scores 
look almost identical. Is this arrangement a new work, or merely a «version» of 
the old one? Or consider a piano reduction of a symphonic score: does this 
bring a new musical work into being, or is it merely a «version» of the old one? 
I put the word «version» in inverted commas, precisely because the question 
will not be solved by the distinction between a work and its versions: for we have 
no clear conception of what a «version» is. Certainly there are arrangements 
which are something more than «versions»: Liszt's arrangements of operatic 
scenes for the piano, for example, or Percy Grainger's incredible two‐piano 
meditation on Bach's «Sheep May Safely Graze», entitled Blithe Bells. Likewise we 
distinguish among orchestrations, between those which are merely orchestral 
versions (such as the versions made by Mahler or Vaughan Williams of their early 
songs for voice and piano), and those which are something more than that—
which involve a creative act that changes the character of the piece and raises 
again the question of identity: for example, Schoenberg's orchestration of 
Brahms's Piano Quartet in G minor, Op. 25, which is sometimes referred to as 
Brahms's Fifth Symphony, so much does it take on a symphonic character in this 
transformation. (Though Brahms would surely not have used a xylophone!) 
More modest orchestrators than Schoenberg may yet add creative touches 
which change the character of a piece entirely. One of the many contributors to 
Les Sylphides (not Glazunov) orchestrated the Waltz in C sharp minor, Op. 64 
No. 2, with the inner voice of Ex. 1.1. This voice is added to, and also in a sense 
discovered in, the musical line, and represents a real creative achievement. 
Perhaps we should speak of a variation, rather than a version, in such a case. (I 
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Ex. 1.1. Chopin, arr. anon., Les Sylphides, Waltz in C sharp minor, Op. 64 No. 2, in original key, second 
episode. 
NB. Orchestrators of this waltz tend to follow Glazunov's example, and transpose it up a semitone to D 
minor, often preceding it with a cello solo derived from the C#‐minor study Op. 25 No. 7. The inner 
voice is not present in Glazunov's version: it may be due to Roy Douglas. 
 
Another puzzling example should once again be considered: Webern's 
orchestration of the six‐part «Ricercar» from Bach's Musical Offering, in which 
the melodic line is broken into motifs, and stuttered out in timbres so opposed 
that the piece seems as though pulverized and reconstituted out of tones that 
Bach would never have imagined (Ex. 1.2). The result is reminiscent of the 
famous story by Borges, «Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote». This tells of 
the writer Pierre Menard, who set out to compose a work which would be word‐
for‐word identical with Cervantes's classic, but written out of the experience and 
the sensibility of a modern writer. Similarly, it is as though Webern had set 
himself the task of composing anew the «Ricercar», from the sensibility of the 
serial composer, but arriving at the very same notes that Bach wrote. Not 
surprisingly, the result is not a version of Bach's great fugue, but another work—
and a minor masterpiece. 
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Ex. 1.2. Webern, orchestration of the six‐part Ricercar from Bach's Musical Offering 
 
Add to such puzzle cases the vast differences that we notice between 
performances, the effects of transposition (necessary at times in vocal music), 
the indeterminacy of musical scores, and the fact that much music is improvised 
and enjoyed as an improvisation (as in jazz), and you will begin to see that there 
are real puzzles about the identity of musical works, and that we ought to try to 
solve them. At least we should try to give some procedure for relating the work 
to its performances, and distinguishing versions of a work from departures that 
are so radical as to be versions of something else. In this work I shall explore the 
background metaphysical questions, returning to the concepts of performance 
and arrangement in chapter «14. Performance» of my The Aesthetics of Music. 
 
§2. Numerical Identity 
We can proceed only if we can avail ourselves of a concept of numerical identity. 
When two objects have all their properties in common, they are qualitatively 
identical; but if they are two, then they are not numerically identical. (Leibniz 
famously denied the possibility that they could be two, thus reducing numerical 
to a special case of qualitative identity, with interesting but highly counter‐
intuitive results.) Could there be a useful concept of numerical identity applied 
to musical works? Why should we require it, and what disadvantages would 
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follow should we abandon it? 
Numerical identity is not always a clearly defined notion, so let us consider 
the various metaphysical categories, in order to ascertain what is required in 
order to define it. 
 
1. THINGS. I use this vague term to cover, not only the «re‐identifiable 
particulars» discussed by Strawson in Individuals, but any of the following:  
 
(a) Ordinary physical objects. 
(b) Organisms, including animals. 
(c) Persons, including human beings. 
(d) Theoretical entities, such as atoms and quarks. 
 
Modern philosophy has shown that these are not all in the same boat, as far as 
identity goes. Sometimes the question whether a is identical with b seems to be 
answered by a convention or decision; at other times the answer seems to lie in 
the nature of things. Consider Hobbes's example of the ship of Theseus,4 the 
planks of which are replaced one by one until not a plank remains unchanged. 
Suppose now the old planks are re‐assembled in their original form. Which is 
the ship of Theseus—the one that emerged as the result of successive repairs, or 
the one that is put together from the debris? It does not matter which you say—
though you cannot say both. 
In the case of personal identity we are presented with the opposite paradigm: 
here it really does matter what we say—legally, morally, and personally. Although 
one philosopher—Derek Parfit5—has argued vigorously that the concept of 
personal identity is just as unfounded as that of the identity of ships, and indeed 
that it would be better not to employ the concept at all because of the moral 
confusion that it engenders, his arguments have not found general favour. The 
person, after all, is the thing that I identify as myself: it is that which I pick out 
incorrigibly as the subject of my first‐person avowals, which stares from these 
eyes and hears with these ears: the very thing that fears for the future and learns 
from the past. Surely it is not arbitrary for me that I should be identical with a 
particular past or future person? 
 
4 Hobbes, De corpore, bk. 2 ch. 1—p. 136 in Thomas Hobbes opera philosophica, ed. Sir Thomas Molesworth, ii. 
5 Reason and Persons (Oxford, 1984). 
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In between those two cases are the non‐rational animals: members of natural 
kinds, whose identity is established by their continuity as living beings. And it is 
in the life of the animals that we gain access to one secure conception of identity 
through time—an identity that is neither bestowed by us nor a matter of 
convention. When we turn to the physical world, we find the «individuals» that 
abound in it all too ready to crumble before our enquiries, to dissolve into 
heaps of atoms, which in turn fragment into the bewildering entities of 
subatomic physics—entities that seem hardly to be things at all. It is at the level 
of systems (animals and people especially) that we seem most convinced that 
numerical identity lies in the nature of things, and is irreducible to an identity 
of qualities. The real puzzle about personal identity comes about because 
persons exemplify two different forms of organization: they are animals, 
members of a natural kind, organized by the principle of life; and they are also 
persons, members of a peculiar moral kind, organized according to a principle 
of intention and responsibility. And we seem to have no a priori guarantee that 
the two forms of organization will always coincide. 
 
2. PROPERTIES. Thing‐identity is not reducible, I have suggested, to quality‐ or 
property‐identity. But what about properties themselves? Is it ever true to say 
that property F is numerically identical with property G? The problem, of 
course, is that we do not have any reason, in normal discourse, to count the 
properties of things. An object has as many properties as there are true ways of 
describing it; nothing is added by saying that one of these descriptions 
attributes precisely the same property as some other. Besides, what would be our 
criterion of identity? It is a truth of biology that the description «has a heart» is 
true of all and only those things that have a kidney. But this coextensiveness of 
two predicates seems to fall far short of proving that they attribute the same 
property. Maybe we should get nearer to a criterion of identity if we think in 
terms of necessity: property F is identical with property G if F and G are 
coextensive in all possible worlds. But that too might be questioned, since it 
implies that «having equal angles« and «having equal sides» denote one and the 
same property of Euclidean triangles—a result that we suppose to be counter‐
intuitive, since we can understand and attribute the one property, without 
having acquired any competence in the other. (Yet are we justified therefore in 
asserting that the properties are really two?) It is likewise a truth of physics that 
all and only blue things emit or reflect light within a certain range of 
wavelengths. Does this mean that blueness is the same property as that of 
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emitting light of that wavelength, or merely that the two properties are always 
conjoined? In chapter «1. Sound» of my The Aesthetics of Music, I gave reasons for 
thinking that this fact would not establish the identity of blueness and the 
property of emitting light of the relevant wavelength. But what would establish 
such an identity? And what hangs upon the answer to such a question? 
I have dwelt on the case of properties for two reasons: first because identity 
cannot here mean identity across time—time and change make no inroads on 
the being of properties—but only an eternal unity. Secondly, because properties 
show us that the question of numerical identity may be undecidable. We have 
no clear criterion of the identity of properties; but we can cheerfully attribute 
properties to objects, and describe the objects themselves as identical in their 
properties. A paradox? I do not know. 
 
3. KINDS. There has been a growing recognition among philosophers, ever since 
John Stuart Mill and C. S. Peirce introduced the topic, that there is a distinction 
among properties between those which identify a kind and those which do not. 
A kind is defined in such a way as to determine the nature of the things which 
fall under it. Blue things do not form a kind: elephants and tables do. Some 
kinds are natural; like the kind elephant, their nature is not bestowed upon them 
by us, but is inherent in the things themselves. Other kinds are artificial, like the 
kind table, defined in terms of a function. Not all kinds are kinds of object: there 
are also kinds of stuff, like water, carbon, or ice‐cream, and again the distinction 
can be made between the natural and the artificial among them. 
While the identity of properties in general remains obscure, the same is not 
always true of kinds. For the nature of a kind is the nature of its instances, and 
kind a is identical with kind b if and only if, in all possible worlds, something is 
an a only if it is a b, and vice versa. Numerical identity is here parasitic on the 
numerical identity of objects. 
 
4. TYPES. A particular kind of kind has proved interesting to students of 
aesthetics: namely the type. The distinction between type and token was made by 
C. S. Peirce,6  though it is to this day unclear how we ought to define it. The 
relation he had in mind was that between the letter «a» of the alphabet, and all 
the individual inscriptions of it. But the example is unhelpful, since no one 
quite knows what it is that we recognize, when we see that a letter is an «a». 
 
6 Selected Writings, p. 406. 
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Consider all the many ways of writing an «a»: is it a shape that we notice? Which 
shape? Or a movement of the hand? Or a fixed contrast with other letters? 
Think of the Arabic alphabet, where to recognize a letter may be to recognize 
where the script is going, a notion that is itself far from transparent. One person's a 
may look like another person's d: only in the system of a person's handwriting is 
its identity as a letter determined. Our ability to recognize that one person's a is 
the same letter as another's is therefore predicated upon our ability to 
recognize identity of actions: itself a highly problematic application of the 
concept of identity, as we shall see. 
A better instance might be the relation that obtains between a particular 
model of a car, and the many instances of it. The Ford Cortina is a type; its 
instances are tokens of the type. The Ford Cortina is also a kind. So what makes 
a kind into a type? Here is my suggestion: a kind is a type when its definition 
lists all the salient features of an individual token: all the features in which we 
should naturally take an interest, if interested in that kind of thing. (For 
example, all the features that contribute to the performance of its function.) 
On this view the elephant is not a type: nor is any other natural kind, since 
natural kinds are not defined by their functions, nor by their salient features. 
 
5. PATTERNS, structures, and abstract particulars. When describing a type, we 
tend to use a singular term, as though identifying a particular rather than a 
universal: the Ford Cortina. Yet the type has instances, which are its tokens, and 
there is no limit to the number of these instances. Types seem to straddle the 
ontological divide between particular and general: we can describe them either 
as abstract particulars (like numbers or sets), or as universals which are 
instantiated in their individual tokens. 
Each type is associated with a genuine abstract particular, which is the pattern, 
or set of instructions, from which it derives. When Henry Ford invented the 
Model T, he produced a pattern: a formula for producing the tokens of a type. 
This pattern is not identical with any concrete object. But nor is it a universal—
a predicate of other things. It is an abstract object, which itself bears the 
predicates of the individuals that exemplify it. The Model T Ford has four 
wheels, a 25 hp engine, and a maximum speed of 60 miles an hour, just like the 
car that is standing in your drive (which is a token Model T). 
Patterns are sometimes called designs—in order to emphasize the creative act 
that produced them. The fact that we understand them as the product of a 
human action explains some of the problems about their identity, as I argue 
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below. But there are abstract particulars which are not designed in this way, yet 
exemplified by objects in the natural world. For example, the structure of the 
human skeleton is exemplified by all normal humans. It can be displayed in a 
model, and described independently of its instances. It is something shared by 
indefinitely many individuals, and yet described as a particular, a bearer of 
properties, which can be varied and changed. It would not be normal to 
describe its instances as tokens of a type, since that would imply that we identify 
the structure through its function, and that we have a prior sense of its salient 
characteristics. Nevertheless, its instances stand to the structure very much as 
the tokens of a type stand to the design that produced them. 
In ordinary thought and action, we do not bother to distinguish the token, 
the type, and the pattern: since we always have the same salient features in 
mind. But we are more concerned to distinguish the structure from its 
instances. This is because the pattern is realized in its instances (in the tokens of 
the relevant type), while the structure is abstracted from its instances. We always 
know what we are talking about, when we describe a design or pattern: about a 
structure we may be half in the dark. Still, designs and structures are alike 
abstract particulars, and their identity‐conditions are determined in the same 
way as the identity‐conditions of kinds in general. Design or structure A is 
identical with design or structure B when every realization or instance of A is 
identical with some realization or instance of B, and vice versa. Hence a design 
can be identical with a structure. (You could produce a design which is identical 
with the structure of the human skeleton.) 
 
6. EVENTS. I have already argued7 that the concept of numerical identity can be 
applied only problematically to events. The case is in fact reminiscent of case 
(2) above. Events are happenings: they take time. This means that we may be 
uncertain as to how we should reidentify them through time. Much depends on 
the circumstances. Presumably my neighbour's noisy party is an event: and I 
awake in the night to find that the very same event is still in being. The next 
night's party is presumably another event. In such cases events are processes: and 
a process is characterized by a governing causal influence. My neighbour's party 
lasts so long as it sustains itself through the gregarious acts of its participants. At 
a certain point the interaction ceases, and the party is over. 
 
 
7 See chapter «1. Sound», The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford, 1993). 
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Event‐identity cannot always be reduced to process‐identity, however, even 
when a process is continuously occurring. The wind constantly waves the 
branches of the tree outside. But how many events are involved here, when does 
each one start and finish, and when do we reidentify an event across time? The 
answer is surely arbitrary: the movement of that frond of leaves was one event: 
or two if you consider the movement first to the left, and then to the right. In 
such circumstances we have as little use for the concept of event‐identity as for 
that of property‐identity (case (2) above). This is not to say that a philosopher 
committed to an ontology of events—the process philosophers such as William 
James and Hartshorne, or Donald Davidson in his quixotic attempt to imprison 
reality in the predicate calculus—could not devise a criterion of numerical 
identity that would deliver consistent and systematic results. But, as I suggested 
in chapter «1. Sound» of my The Aesthetics of Music, the most plausible attempt so 
far made —Davidson's theory of events, as identified through the totality of 
their causal relations— is a far cry from any test that we could apply, and 
suggests an almost Schopenhauerian contempt for the world of appearance, 
and for the things that figure in it. 
The insecurity of identity is even more evident when we turn to pure events, 
as I have called them—events which do not happen to any thing, but which are 
identified in themselves, and not through other things. Sounds and smells are 
the paradigm cases: secondary objects that are produced by things, but do not 
inhere in them. We certainly speak of numerical identity here. The question 
«Did you hear that sound?» implies that I heard a sound, and that I am 
wondering whether you too heard a sound, and, if so, whether the sound heard 
by you is the same as that heard by me. But here our concept of numerical 
identity is that of identity at a time. When it comes to identity over time the case 
is far less clear. We could adopt various criteria of course: for example, we might 
say that a sound lasts as long as the physical process that produces it. But this 
will not fit the normal case of musical sounds, which endure through radical 
changes in the mode of their production, as when a sustained tremolando on 
the violins is maintained by handing it from one desk to the next in the 
orchestra. From the point of view of music, as we have seen, the mode of 
production of a sound sinks away into the background, and our experience of 
duration and change resides in the tones themselves. And here there seems to 
be nothing independent that constrains our decision to say that a given sound is 
numerically the same, but changed, rather than a new individual. 
In the pure sound world it is qualitative identity that determines numerical 
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identity; identity is then merely the last stage of similarity. Our experience of 
«same again» is really an experience of similarity, and not the «recognition of 
an individual» in any strict sense. Yet we have a version of the latter experience 
too, as when we recognize a theme or a chord, changed in this or that respect, 
but still the same. What exactly is going on here? 
Two facts should be borne in mind. The first is that sounds belong to 
recognized types. Sounds have salient features which fill our attention; and 
when identified in terms of those features, they are identified as types. Each 
token of the type will then be recognized as the same again. Music exploits 
these salient features: pitch and timbre in particular, and the notation devised 
for music is devised precisely so that sound tokens can be prescribed and 
reproduced in accordance with a type. 
The second fact is that the individuals which we hear in music do not exist in 
the material world of sounds: they are not sounds, nor even sound types, but 
tones. The theme is an intentional object, and to recognize a theme as «the 
same again» is to make a judgement of «intentional identity». There is no way of 
specifying «sameness of sound» which will capture what we mean by the identity 
of a musical individual. To this point I shall return. 
In the musical context, the most salient features of a sound are pitch and 
duration of pitch. The primary experience of «same again» is an experience of 
these two. For a musical experience however, we require temporal organization 
of successive sounds: and that means not merely measure and tempo, but the 
experience, far more vivid than that of pitch itself, of the relative pitches of 
neighbouring sounds. These provide other dimensions of «same again»: the 
dimensions that we perceive as rhythm and movement. When we have 
prescribed pitches, durations, tempo, and measure, we have specified a type of 
sound event that will be a recognizable vehicle of the musical experience. This 
is what a piano score presents: pitches and durations are specified by the notes, 
measure by the barlines. Of course those are not the only relevant variables 
from the musical point of view. But they are the features that form our primary 
way of identifying the sound types which interest us as music. They are 
identified in terms of a design: instructions that are realized in a performance, 
when a particular instance of a sound pattern is produced. If there are 
problems about the identity of musical works, I suggest, it is not because the 
idea of such a design is vague or incoherent. It is in part because the individuals 
that are produced in realizing it—the individual sound events—have only fuzzy 
conditions of identity. They suffer from the metaphysical insecurity that 
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surrounds the concept of a pure event. But it is also because musical designs are 
the products of human actions. 
 
7. ACTIONS. Actions are events, and share the identity‐problems of events. But 
they have further problems of their own, which stem from their intentionality. 
Wittgenstein's well‐known rhetorical question —«What is left over if I subtract 
the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?» (Philosophical 
Investigations, § 621)— reminds us of the distinction between movement and 
action. The same action can be performed by different movements, and one 
and the same movement can be made when performing two quite different 
actions. And an action depends for its identity on the intention behind it: a 
movement which causes death may be a murder; in the absence of mens rea 
however, that is certainly the wrong description. 
The problems of action‐description and identity are familiar to students of 
philosophy and law, and their complexity must excuse me from discussing 
them. Nevertheless, we should recognize that works of music, whatever they are, 
originate in human actions, and are understood as intended objects. The design 
which determines the performances of a work of music is an intended design, 
and the intention is underdetermined by the score which records it. Whether 
we count an arrangement as a version of the original or as a new work, will 
depend in part on the intention of the arranger. And the difference between a 
performance and a travesty lies in our sense of the distance between the 
composer's intention and the performer's product. 
Moreover, we perceive human action differently from the way in which we 
perceive other events. The Verstehen with which we grasp the intention and 
reasoning behind an action is part of our unconscious dialogue with the agent. 
Actions are shaped in our perception by the question «why?», asking for a 
reason rather than a cause. And the same is true of the musical design. A sense 
of the composer's intention inhabits our musical perception, and influences the 
translation of sound into tone. 
 
§3. The Identity of the Musical Work 
What in the world is a work of music? In one sense the work of music has no 
identity: no material identity, that is. For the work is what we hear or are 
intended to hear in a sequence of sounds, when we hear them as music. And 
this—the intentional object of musical perception—can be identified only 
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through metaphors, which is to say, only through descriptions that are false. 
There is nothing in the material world of sound that is the work of music. But 
this should not prompt those metaphysical fantasies that lead philosophers to 
situate the work of music in another world, or another dimension, or another 
level of being.8 Rather, it reminds us that questions of numerical identity are 
sometimes of no importance. 
Let us take a parallel case: painting. What is a painting, and when is painting a 
identical with painting b? We are on slightly firmer ground here, since the 
temptation is to say that paintings are ordinary physical objects, located in 
space, which can be identified and reidentified by our normal criterion, of 
spatio‐temporal continuity. But such a criterion does not capture the salient 
feature of a painting, which is the aspect that we see in it, when we see with 
understanding. Suppose water cascades over Giorgione's Sleeping Venus and 
washes the image away: would this physical object still be Giorgione's Sleeping 
Venus? Surely, we should say that Giorgione's painting had been destroyed by 
this calamity, and that whatever remains is something else, not the painting. (It 
is like the case of an animal that dies: what remains, the dead body, is not old 
Fido the dog.) 
Suppose, on the other hand, a device had been discovered that could read 
the image from a painting and exactly reproduce it, colours, textures, and all. 
And suppose, before the calamity, Giorgione's painting had been read by this 
device, and transferred to another canvas. Should we not be disposed to say that 
the painting had been saved from destruction? At least, we should think that 
nothing important had been lost, and if identity had been lost, then identity is 
not important. 
This kind of thought might lead us to suppose that, when treating paintings as 
representations, we are really considering them as types, whose salient features 
reside in the coloured surface and all that pertains to it when we see its pictorial 
quality.9 All that interests us in a painting can be specified by describing the 
salient features that enable us exactly to reproduce what we see in it, when we 
see it as a painting. If we cannot quite rest with that suggestion, it is because it is 
indifferent to one of the most important aesthetic features of paintings: namely, 
that they are understood as the unique tokens of the type. What is appreciated in 
 
8 See e.g. R. Ingarden, The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity (1928), tr. A. Czerniawski, ed. J. G. 
Harrell (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1986). 
9 See the discussion in R. Wollheim, Art and its Object, sects. 3 5–7, and the important qualifications added in the 
appendix to the 2nd edn. 
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a painting is a design realised in a single instance. 
But that suggests an equally straightforward answer to the question of identity. 
What we see in a painting, when we see it pictorially, is an intentional object of 
sight, defined by a description that is literally false. The content of the painting 
is no part of the material world, and as suspicious as a subject of identity‐
statements as any other member of the intentional realm. The painting itself is 
a uniquely exemplified design, defined by its salient features: those features that 
would enable us to reproduce precisely this pictorial experience. We could 
imagine a set of coordinates drawn across the surface of the picture, specifying 
all the colours and visual textures that occur on every point of it. This would be 
a complete specification of the design: and it would not mention what is seen in 
the picture by the one who sees with understanding. It would be a painterly 
equivalent of the musical score, and would identify the painting completely, as 
the painting that it is. This suggestion is quite compatible with the view that, if 
we were to reproduce this pattern again and again, and so convert the painting 
from a unique realization into a type, we should radically change its aesthetic 
character. (The Mona Lisa as dishcloth.) But there is no way in which identity 
conditions can be made to follow aesthetic character, in this case or in any 
other. For aesthetic character is part of the intentional, rather than the material, 
reality of the object. We cannot require, therefore, that a change in aesthetic 
character, is always and necessarily a change in the identity of the material 
object that possesses it. 
Here then is an answer to our original question: to identify the work of music 
in the material world is to identify the sound pattern intended by the composer, 
which is realized in performance by producing sound events. This sound 
pattern defines the salient features of the musical work, and can be written 
down in the form of a score. 
The puzzles that we encountered in the first section arise for a simple reason: 
namely, that some features are more salient than others. There is a prominent 
foreground in the musical sound type, which is given by relative pitch, duration, 
measure, and tempo, and any reproduction of those features will bring a 
forceful impression of «the same again». The reason for this is clear: when these 
features are determined, so too are rhythm, melody, and harmony—in so far as 
these intentional objects can be determined by material means. The salient 
features of a musical work, in other words, are those which contribute to its 
tonal organization: the organization that we hear, when we hear sounds as 
tones. This is why we distinguish versions of a work, without denying their 
 




Roger Scruton | © 
Disputatio 3 (2013), pp. 25-50 
 
identity with the original. The piano reduction, orchestral arrangement, 
transposition, all coincide with the organizational foreground: and hence we 
describe them as versions of a single work, and assume that we do no violence to 
the composer's intention. It is precisely when a work is arranged so as to disrupt 
or reorder its rhythmic, melodic, or harmonic organization that we feel inclined 
to deny its identity with the original—as with Webern's orchestration of the six‐
part «Ricercar». 
We could adopt a stricter criterion, and add colour and timbre to the 
specification of the relevant sound pattern. Nothing whatsoever hangs on the 
decision, since the concept of numerical identity is here entirely a matter of 
convenience. We should not worry that the versions of a work are qualitatively 
so different: for it is quality that interests us in any case, and the assignment of 
identities serves no purpose except that of distributing the credits. If we say that 
Chopin's C sharp minor Waltz is another work as it appears in the Sylphides, it is 
because we wish to draw attention either to the recomposition that has changed 
its aesthetic character, or to the changed artistic intention. 
The question of the relation between work and performance is rather more 
difficult. A performance is an attempt to determine the intentional object of a 
musical experience, by realizing the salient features of a sound pattern. If 
performances vary it is partly because there are features of any performance 
that are not specified in the pattern, even though the musical experience 
depends upon them, and partly because the sound pattern underdetermines 
the intention which originally produced it. The performer therefore has an 
important part to play in the production of the aesthetic experience, 
completing the transition from the intended design to its realization, and in 
doing so completing the musical experience. What are the constraints that bind 
him, and how do we understand his contribution? To those questions see 
chapter «14. Performance» of my The Aesthetics of Music. 
 
§4. Notation and Identity 
It follows from what I have said, that a work of music can be fully identified 
through a system of notation: any notation which unambiguously identifies the 
salient features of the sound pattern will identify the work. Now not every 
notation does do this. For example, the figured bass which leaves out the inner 
parts leaves a freedom to the performer which must be filled by tradition, 
convention, and education if the pattern is to be realized as a musical event. 
Alternatively, we may wish to adopt a looser condition of identity here, and say 
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that it suffices to follow the chord patterns of the figured bass‐line to achieve a 
«version» of the work. (Compare the many versions of a Bach cantata.) Opting 
for the stronger identity‐condition is a way of saying that the performer is not as 
free as he might like to think, that tradition and convention are here all‐
important, and that there are ways of ruining the work that have not been ruled 
out by the score. 
In aleatoric music the performer's freedom may be part of the point, 
although it is a freedom constrained by incomplete instructions which leave a 
residue to chance. In improvisation, the freedom of the performer is greater 
still—and here notation follows performance, rather than preceding it. In jazz 
the writing down of a piece may consist merely in the specification of a melody 
and an harmonic sequence. To follow the sequence, while improvising around 
the melody, is to give a «version» of the piece. Versions will be so different that 
very few listeners would wish to say that they are instances of a single 
composition. Indeed, composition and performance are inseparable. The work 
consists in what the performer does. The performance rules the work, and even 
if it is recorded or written down, so as to become familiar as a pattern, it is 
appreciated nevertheless as a single sound event. When performance and work 
are fused in this way, recording does not transfer our interest from the 
performance to the abstract structure. We are interested, not in an action‐type, 
but in an individual action. 
The history of classical music would be inconceivable without the invention of 
the notational system which has enabled the composer to specify the work 
before its performance. It is not surprising, therefore, that Nelson Goodman 
has looked to this notational system as providing the answer to questions of 
musical ontology.10 He proposes a strict criterion of identity, according to which 
the score uniquely identifies a work of music, so that any performance that 
exactly follows the score, and obeys all the instructions contained in it, is a 
performance of the individual work. No other performance «complies» with the 
work, which can be defined either intensionally, through the score, or 
extensionally, as the «compliance class» which that score determines. 
Of course much that the performer does is not commanded by the score: but 
the performance complies with the score—i.e. it is a performance of the work—
just so long as all the instructions in the score are followed. A performance with 
a mistake in it is therefore not a performance of the work, any more than one 
that takes Horowitz‐like liberties. 
 
10 Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Oxford, 1969), chs. 4 and 5, esp. pp. 177–91. 
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Should we accept this stringent criterion? Commentators have waxed hot 
under the collar about it, especially about the counter‐intuitive implication that 
an incorrect performance is really a correct performance of another work 
(although one that has yet to be written down). But Goodman can say that if he 
wishes: he neither misrepresents the facts in doing so, nor constrains our 
musical perception. It is up to us to determine which features of the sound 
token are features of the pattern. And after all, the score is designed precisely to 
settle that question; so why not allow to it the last word? If the result is counter‐
intuitive, it is only because we have failed to realize that numerical identity is at 
our behest, and that it is qualitative similarity that really concerns us. We wish to 
know how far two tokens can vary without violating our sense of the «same 
again». And that is not determined by a criterion of numerical identity ranging 
over «material» objects, not even if those objects are abstract particulars or 
items of notation. The «identity» that concerns us is an intentional identity—an 
identity in appearance, which translates into no material fact. 
On the other hand, one might reasonably object to Goodman's priorities, and 
to the bias towards writing that his strict criterion betrays. Whole traditions of 
music‐making have grown and perpetuated themselves without the benefit of 
scores; and even if it is true that here, as elsewhere, the habit of writing has 
greatly expanded the possibilities of learning from one's predecessors, writing is 
nevertheless no more than a device for recording what exists independently—
the sound pattern—so facilitating the production of future instances. The 
musical work exists in the habit of its reproduction. While this habit is 
facilitated by notation, it would seem strange to allow notation to dictate the 
nature of the thing itself. Better perhaps to allow our concept of numerical 
identity to be shaped by the live tradition, by our sense of what matters in a true 
performance, and of the distinction between trivial and serious departures. It 
might be very important to us that we consider Schubert's «Death and the 
Maiden» Quartet and Mahler's arrangement to be versions of the same work, 
and attribute that work to the creative genius of Schubert. And it might be 
equally important to us that we distinguish Brahms's arrangement for piano left‐
hand of the Bach Chaconne in D minor from Bach's original, from Busoni's 
two‐hand version, and from Schumann's little‐known version for violin and 
piano. These three works are animated by three quite different artistic 
intentions. They are not versions of one work, but four works with a single 
source—albeit a source so great that it has filled four channels with its 
unbrookable creative energy. Those are the kinds of consideration that are 
likely to determine our choice of identity‐conditions. 
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What I have said would be acceptable, with a few modifications, to many of 
those who have recently considered the question of musical ontology—notably 
to Nicholas Wolterstorff,11 with his conception of works of music as 
«performance kinds». (Although John Bender, arguing along lines similar to 
those that I have followed, gives reasons for rejecting the idea that 
performances are instances of a work, rather than realizations of it.)12  
Jerrold Levinson, however, does not share this point of view. For him a great 
danger lurks for all who would specify the identity of a musical work in abstract 
terms—as a «sound structure» or sound type.13 (His own use of ‘sound 
structure’ is of no significance in the present context, and I shall ignore his 
unwarranted desire to include the ‘performance means’ among the conditions 
of a work's identity.) The danger is this: if the work is an abstract object or a 
universal, then it is, like all such entities, eternal. It no more comes into being 
when the composer writes it down than did blueness come into being with the 
first blue thing. The best we can say is that the composer discovered it: but it 
might have been discovered by another composer at some other time, like a 
mathematical proof. 
This result seems paradoxical to Levinson, for the reason that it seems to 
mislocate one of the most important of a work's aesthetic qualities: namely its 
originality. This is something that we appreciate in the Overture to A Midsummer 
Night's Dream, for example, because we believe that Mendelssohn created the 
work, and created it at a certain time. It was hard to do that, a great 
achievement, something requiring genius, taste, and inspiration. It was not so 
hard for Weinberger to write the Polka in S˘vanda Dudák, given the existence of 
Dvor˘ák's Slavonic Dances (particular the A flat major dance from the First 
Book). Originality is something that we observe and appreciate in the music: an 
indispensable feature of music as an art. 
In response to this worry, Levinson tries to build into the conditions for a 
work's identity a reference to the composer's activity: a work is a sound structure 
(and performance means) as specified by so‐and‐so at such a time. And he is 
 
11 Wolterstorff, «The Work of Making a Work of Music». In: P. Alperson (ed.), What is Music?: An Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Music (University Park, Pa., 1994). 
12 «Music and Metaphysics: Types and Patterns, Performances and Works», Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical 
Association (Apr. 1991). 
13 «What a Musical Work Is». In: Music, Art and Metaphysics (Ithaca, NY, (1990), pp. 63–88. 
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surely right to imply that the musical design is understood and appreciated as 
the outcome of an action. On the other hand, reference to this action does 
nothing to answer Levinson's difficulty. An abstract object does not become 
time‐bound merely because we relate it to a particular person's encounter with 
it. It is still the case that this work, construed in just this way, exists timelessly, 
and did not come into being with the gesture that is incorporated into its 
definition. 
There is indeed something strange in Levinson's worry, as in the extended 
defence of musical Platonism embarked on by Peter Kivy, who happily endorses 
the «conclusion» that works of music are discovered rather than made.14 For 
one thing we should recognize that the problem is not specific to music: works 
of literature too are designs, realized in their spoken and written instances. But 
they too are appreciated for their originality. As I have shown above, we might 
also be constrained to confer a similar kind of identity on a painting. So did 
Giorgione's Sleeping Venus precede his painting her? 
Let us take another case. Every time I do something or say something, I have 
performed a particular action; I have also indicated a pattern. Somebody else 
could do or say the same thing, by producing another instance of the pattern. 
Does this mean that nothing that I say or do is my doing, but at best only my 
discovery? Surely, common sense tells us that there is such a thing as doing 
something for the first time, and that this is what we mean by originality, even if 
the thing done can be described (as is logically unavoidable) as the instance of 
a pattern? Moreover, things done are done in response to other things done. 
The first performance of an action is likely to be regarded as a peculiarly 
important instance: being a first instance of a pattern, or a model for a type, is 
the kind of feature that must spring to our attention, if we are to understand the 
world of human conduct. 
Moreover, the argument—both Levinson's defence of his view and Kivy's 
attack on it—shows precisely what is wrong with a certain kind of Platonism. 
The sense in which types, kinds, structures, and patterns are eternal does not 
prevent them from having a history, any more than the kind: tiger is prevented 
by its status as a kind from having a history, from coming into existence and 
passing away. The history of a kind is the history of its instances. It would be 
small consolation to the ecologist to learn that the tiger exists eternally, so that 
nothing need be done to ensure its survival. The eternal nature of the type 
 
14 «Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defense». In: The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music 
(Cambridge, 1993), pp. 35–58. 
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consists merely in the fact that, considered as a type, temporal determinations do 
not apply to it; it does not imply that it preceded its first token, for it is only 
through its tokens that it can precede or succeed anything. 
Often when writers notice that this or that feature of a work of art is an 
immovable part of its aesthetic character, they feel tempted to say that the 
feature must therefore belong to the identity‐conditions of the work. (Thus 
Strawson in an early article, who defines the criterion of identity for a work of 
art as «the totality of the features relevant to an aesthetic appraisal»).15 But if 
you take this line you will end by saying that every observable feature of a work 
belongs among its identity‐conditions, since nothing observable can be 
discounted from the aesthetic effect. Once again you have run qualitative 
identity and numerical identity together. 
There is another reason for resisting the temptation. The aesthetic character 
of a musical work does not reside in the sounds, but in the tones that we hear in 
them. It is reasonable to identify works of music as sound patterns, only because 
we thereby identify the vehicle of the musical experience. But that experience is 
sensitive to many things besides the salient features of the sound, and to 
attempt to build all those things into a criterion for the identity of the sound is 
to embark on a task that has no conclusion. Because we know that Mendelssohn 
composed his overture when he did, we hear it differently. The intentional 
object of musical perception is affected by this knowledge, just as it would be 
affected by the knowledge that we had all along been wrong, since the overture 
was written by Mendelssohn's sister Fanny. But the way I have chosen to express 
myself in that last sentence is surely the right one: I am supposing that this 
overture, this very same piece, might have been written by Fanny. 
The Marxists think of the aesthetic experience as having «historicity»—it is a 
transient manifestation of human life, dependent upon those particular 
economic conditions that create the ideological interest in «mere appearances». 
Whether they are right is a matter to see chapter «15. Culture» of my The 
Aesthetics of Music. But the aesthetic experience is certainly sensitive to history: a 
sense of our historical position, however rudimentary, is contained within it, 
and leads us to endow works of music with indelible historical characters. No 
periodization is easier or more natural than that which comes to us with our 
experience of music. Our sense that a given piece just must have been 
composed exactly then and there, and by that composer, is one of the most vivid 
 
15 «Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art». In: Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London, 1974), pp. 
178–88. 
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historical experiences that we have. Why is that? The answer must be sought in 
the nature of musical perception. The acousmatic realm is structured by virtual 
actions and virtual intentions. We hear these with the same immediacy as we 
perceive the actions and motives of our fellows. A work of music directly 
acquaints us with a form of human life, and with the style and mannerisms of a 
period—just as do the expressions, and the forms of dress that we witness in an 
Elizabethan portrait. Hence we can hear the originality of a work, with the same 
immediacy as we hear its composer's style. 
 
§6. Intentional Identity 
Levinson's theory of musical works identifies them as sound «structures». He 
situates them unambiguously in the material world of sounds, as complex 
secondary objects, though somewhat eccentrically described. And there is in 
truth no useful concept of the identity of a musical work that does not operate 
in that way, as a specification of a structure or pattern that is realized in physical 
sounds. 
Yet his qualms stem from the fact that the intentional character of the musical 
work is not fixed by the identity conditions of the sound‐structure. To identify 
musical works in that way is to identify the things in which we hear music. It is 
comparable to the method I proposed for identifying a picture, through a 
graph which assigns coordinates to all the colours and textures of the painted 
surface, but which says nothing about the figure of Venus that we see in them. 
And, someone might suppose, the real question is about her: where and what is 
she? 
Is there anything to be said in answer to this question? And is it a real 
question of ontology? We certainly use the concept of identity when describing 
the intentional objects of our mental states. It is perfectly coherent to say, for 
example, that I saw my mother in my dream last night—i.e. that the woman of 
whom I dreamed was my mother. There are even cases of pure ‘intentional 
identity’, as Geach has pointed out in a distinguished paper.16 (For example, 
«John thinks that the witch who blighted Harry's mare is the same as the one 
who, Dan believes, blighted his cow». The identity sign is here strung between 
terms in intentional contexts—contexts which, for Quine and many of his 
followers, must be understood as referentially opaque. And it is a queer kind of 
identity sign that lies between terms that do not refer!) 
 
16 «Intentional Identity». In: Logic Matters, pp. 146–52. 
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In the case of music, the experience of «same again», which prompts us to 
speak of numerical identity, is associated with those strange quasi‐individuals in 
the world of tones to which I referred in the preceding chapters: to melodies, 
phrases, gestures, and movements. In musical quotation, for example, these 
quasi‐individuals appear to us, lifted from their context and shown in another 
light—as the opening phrase of Tristan und Isolde is mocked in Debussy's 
«Golliwog's Cake‐Walk», or the Seventh Symphony of Shostakovich in Bartók's 
Concerto for Orchestra. Is this not a case of pure intentional identity? For certainly 
the sound patterns are here not the same, by any of the criteria that I have so 
far deferred to. The only sense we can make of these cases is this: that what we 
hear in the one work is numerically identical with what we hear in the other, but 
qualitatively different. The same theme in another context. And yet there is no 
way to spell out that identity in terms of the material properties of the sounds. 
There is a parallel in the world of painting, when the person whom I see in 
one picture is seen as identical with the person whom I see in another, but 
transformed. But there is a difference: in the case of the paintings I am 
deploying a concept of identity—identity of persons—that derives from the 
material world, and which I learn by applying it to genuine individuals. It is not 
so clear that the individuals in the world of tones can be encountered 
elsewhere. Our sense of their individuality is primitive and irreducible. 
But for that very reason, we should not expect a theory of musical ontology to 
give us an account of the intentional object of hearing. If it strays into the world 
where the musical individual is encountered, it is a world of metaphor—of 
things that do not and cannot exist. If it stays in the world of sound, then it can 
do no more than specify the sound patterns that make the musical experience 
available. There is no third possibility, which means that there is nothing 
further to be said. 
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